Towson
Political Science Essay

It can be hard for politicians to agree on anything, or so says the cliché. The 107th Congress certainly experienced their share of conflict and divergence. But representatives on both sides of the aisle and in both chambers of the Capitol did agree on one important fact two years ago: The No Child Behind legislation enacted by Congress was the most sweeping change in federal education policy in 35 years.

The Birth of a Bill
While on the campaign trail in 2000, Bush described his disappointment with the "soft bigotry of low expectations" for too many students. He "envisioned a strong national role in education policy" (Rudalevige). Many other Republicans disagreed with this view -- indeed, Congressman John Boehner (R-OH), who introduced Bush's legislation into the House a year later, called for the abolishment of the Department of Education in 1995 (Gorman).

Bush's vision took shape through the reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. Originally enacted in 1965, the act is reauthorized every four to six years, "usually under a catchy new banner" (Rudalevige). Title 1 – a program that provides funding to support disadvantaged children – is the most significant portion of the act. It had last been overhauled in 1994, adding terms like "performance standards" and "adequate yearly progress." The bill included few consequences for states and communities who did not meet the standards, though – a fact that Bush set out to fix. The House Committee on Education and the Workforce began working on reauthorizing the Elementary and Secondary Education Act in 1999. The committee's proposals were unable to find support among the Congress. "After 2 years of debate and several pieces of legislation, we were unable to put a package together," Congressman Buck McKeon (R-CA) said during the House floor debate. For the first time since the act's inception, it was not reauthorized according to schedule.

President Bush's campaign promises regarding education moved from words to action shortly after the Supreme Court certified his election. "Bipartisan education reform will be the cornerstone of my Administration," Bush said in January (Bush). The planning for "No Child Left Behind," as it was named, began before Bush was inaugurated, in a December 2000 meeting. "It began with a meeting in Austin, Texas when the President-elect invited Members of both parties to discuss education reform," one participant said. About 20 members of Congress attended this first meeting (Rudalevige).

Bush's proposals were years in the making. The PBS program Frontline described a small green notebook titled "A Draft Position for George W. Bush on K-12 Education," filled with notes by Bush adviser Sandy Kress. It was dated 1999. Kress outlined how Bush could change the federal role in education: "Unhappily, after spending billions and billions of dollars on education, the federal government has made virtually no meaningful difference in helping educate our children. As a result of this cynical, shameful, and wasteful behavior, other politicians have decided that there should be no federal role in education at all. Our citizenry, which regularly says that education is the nation's most important cause, needs to understand the sharp contrast between Governor Bush's vigor and the utter sloppiness of the keepers of the status quo" (Lemann).

The administration revealed their blueprint for the No Child Left Behind legislation on January 23 – just two days after the inauguration (Press Conference). The document rested on four pillars: Increased accountability for student performance, a focus on what works, reduced bureaucracy and increased flexibility, and empowerment of parents. It listed seven performance-based priorities: Improving the academic performance of disadvantaged students, boosting teacher quality, moving limited English proficient students to English fluency, promoting informed parental choice and innovative programs, encouraging safe schools for the 21st century, increasing funding for impact aid, and encouraging freedom and accountability (No Child).

The blueprint was heavy on overviews, bullet points, and summaries. By presenting his beliefs and goals, Bush allowed Congress to determine specific letters and phrases for the bill. "This was great political strategy," one Democratic staff member said. "When you put out legislation, then you're fighting for colons and sentences and subheadings. The White House had orders: don't get bogged down in details" (Rudalevige). That is where the Congress came in.

To the House
Bush's blueprint was drafted into legislation by a team headed by Boehner. The bill was referred to the House Committee on Education and the Workforce on March 23. The committee held 11 hearings to review the proposals.

When introduced to the committee, the bill included provisions allowing for private school vouchers. Under the heading Parental Choice, it stated that "In any case described in section 1116(b)(7)(A)(ii)(II) the local educational agency shall permit the parents of each eligible child defined in paragraph (7)(A) to (A) receive, from the agency, the child's share of funds allocated to the school under this part, calculated under paragraph (2); and (B) use those funds to pay the costs of...attending a private school [or] obtaining supplemental educational services from a provider approved for that purpose by the State educational agency."

Republicans fought to include this language in the final bill. On the initial committee level, though, they did not have enough votes to pass provisions related to private school choice. The group voted 27 to 20 to remove the voucher provisions, and the Bush administration admitted that it lacked the votes needed to pass the proposal (Hess).

Noting that "will there be vouchers?" was the ‘official Washington question' about the bill, New Yorker columnist Nicholas Lemann pointed out that "the cognoscenti knew that vouchers had been dead from the beginning." He wrote that "Bush didn't push hard for them when he was governor of Texas, and he hinted broadly...that they were a weak preference for him" (Lemann). Nonetheless, they were a key component of the debate over the No Child Left Behind proposals.

Another change made to Bush's blueprint related to annual student testing. Bush's draft required states to administer the National Assessment of Educational Progress to a group of students, to ensure that state tests are rigorous enough. When the bill left committee, the language was changed to allow states to select the NAEP or "another reliable sample of student achievement" (Gorman).

On May 9, the committee voted 41 to 7 in favor of the amended bill. From there, it was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary, for its consideration of any applicable provisions.

Near midnight on May 16th, resolution H. Res. 143 was reported to the House. It allowed for consideration of H. R. 1, and allotted two hours of general debate. Bill sponsor Boehner commenced the discussion. "Beginning today, we have an opportunity to make a true difference in the lives of our Nation's children, particularly our most disadvantaged children in America," he said.

Congressman Dale Kildee (D-MI) pointed out the balancing act the Congress was engaged in. "Today's consideration of H.R. 1 marks the end of many busy and work-filled nights and weekends over the past 4 months. I strongly believe that this bill enacts meaningful bipartisan education reform by striking the right balance. Clearly from the final resolution of issues in the reported bill, we all gave some, and some probably feel they gave too much. But the result is a bipartisan bill" (Congressional).

Bipartisanship and compromise were topics many representatives highlighted. "Often, we in Congress let the perfect be the enemy of the good," Congressman Cass Ballenger (R-NC) said on the House floor. "Does this bill have everything we conservatives want? No. Does this bill have everything liberals want? No. Does H.R. 1 have concrete reforms which will give States and local schools the resources they need to better educate our youth? Absolutely" (Congressional).

Democrats expressed concern about the annual testing provisions, public school choice provisions, and threats of Republican amendments pushing vouchers and block grants. Some Democrats also pushed for additions to the bill relating to smaller class sizes, bilingual education, and school construction efforts. "I submit to this Congress, if 5- and 6- and 7-, 8-, 9-, 10-, 11-, 12-year-olds could vote, they would vote us all out of the place," Congressman Harold Ford (D-TN) said. "Because not one of them would support learning in a school that was 40 to 50 years old, where water does not run, where roofs are falling in" (Congressional).

Other Democrats were strongly opposed to the proposed legislation. Congresswoman Lynn Rivers (D-MI) described it as a power grab by the Federal Government. "Less bad is not good. It is not legitimate to argue for passage of a flawed proposal on the basis that it could be worse," she said. "This bill is a mirage. It is not what it seems to be, and it makes a terrible trade. It stands a two-century tradition of community-controlled schools on its head in exchange for the mere illusion of reform. Vote ‘no'" (Congressional). Some Republicans believed that major reforms introduced by the President were left out of the House bill. "The flexibility for States has been eliminated. The parental empowerment has been weakened. The results accountability has been added to the bill, but the red tape, where local school districts and States have to report back to Washington on how they spend their money, has been maintained," Congressman Pete Hoekstra (R-MI) said (Congressional).

Former education secretary Bill Bennett said he would plead with the president to fight for the proposals Bush outlined. "The proposals he sent up to the Hill are good proposals," Bennett said. "But right now they are in the process of being eviscerated...I know he wants to get a bill signed. But it's critical to get a good bill signed" (On Way).

Vouchers re-emerged as an issue in the full House, when an amendment permitting vouchers was introduced. It was defeated 273 to 155. It would have provided low-income parents with a $1,500 stipend to send children to private or religious schools (Alvarez). "Bush had to abandon or water-down much of his original plan," the New York Times reported after the House vote. "His voucher plan did not obtain the votes to pass. His original testing provision was stronger than the one in the House bill or what the Senate is expected to endorse, forcing clear state-to-state comparisons. And his plan to give states much greater control over how to spend federal education dollars was stripped out by the House and has been scaled back considerably in the Senate" (Alvarez).

After just two days of debate, H.R. 1 was passed by a margin of 384 to 45.

On the Senate Side
As the House considered its education reform bill, the Senate grappled with its own version. The Senate's Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions unanimously adopted the "Better Education for Students and Teachers Act" (BEST) on March 28. It was based on President Bush's January blueprint. The bill stalled in committee for a month before Senators became restless.

On April 26, Senator Lott filed a cloture motion on the act, stating that "there have been many days of negotiation. A lot of progress has been made. Everybody acknowledges that. But this bill should have been taken up in March. Now here we are almost in May and we are still negotiating." On May 1, a vote of 96 to 3 invoked cloture, and the full Senate took up the measure for consideration two days later. Senator Jeffords commenced debate, offering a substitute bill that presented "improvements."

"I think it is fair to say that this is the most dramatic reform of Federal elementary and secondary education law since the enactment of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act in 1965," Jeffords said. "...I look forward to the debate and I especially look forward to passing a bill that will enable every child in this nation to have a first rate education" (Congressional 3 May 2001).

Discussion surrounding S.1 lasted many weeks in the Senate. "In a departure from the usual protocol, the White House did not treat the chairman of [the committee], James Jeffords...as the person in charge of the bill; his switching parties surely has something to do with [that fact]...Instead, the White House treated a whole bunch of senators...as quasi-managers of the bill, with the result that all of them are bursting with parental pride, in amounts totaling more than a hundred per cent, and that the bill didn't move along as quickly as it had in the House" (Lemann).

The language used by members of Congress is notable at times. Senator Robert Torricelli (D-NJ)'s words are a prime example: "We all recognize the same thing: America's educational problems point like a dagger at the heart of our national prosperity--indeed, one day even our national security. America cannot long endure with this standard of living without dealing in a major way, on a grand scale, with our persistent, almost endemic problems of education" (Congressional 3 May 2001).

After many edits and amendments, the vote finally took place on June 14. As described in the Congressional Record, the Senate "struck all after the Enacting Clause" of H.R 1 and "substituted the language of S.1 amended." 91 yea votes were recorded, versus 8 nays.

"A Difference of Opinion"
Thomas Jefferson believed that a conference was appropriate "in all cases of difference of opinion between the two Houses on matters depending between them" (House). There certainly was a difference of opinion between the two Houses with regards to the education reform legislation, and so a conference was formed following the Senate's vote in June.

The Senate procedure manual describes conferences in detail. "Conference committees are created by the two Houses of Congress to resolve the differences in the respective versions of any item of legislation which they both pass. This is made necessary because bills and resolutions on the same general subject, especially controversial ones, are regularly passed or adopted by the two bodies in different forms. Before any single measure can become law, however, any differences in the two passed versions must be compromised. Both Houses must eventually pass every measure in an identical form before any such measure may be enrolled or become law" (Riddick's).

On July 10, the Senate requested a conference, and appointed 25 conferees. On the House side, Boehner moved that a conference should be established. This motion passed 424 to 5, and 14 House conferees were named. Conferences were held on July 19, August 1, September 25, October 30, and November 30. The conference report was filed on December 11.

H.R. 1 was moving expeditiously through Congress. But this "came to a halt due to the impact it could have on the states" (History). A report by the General Accounting Office indicated that many schools would be labeled "failing" based on the standards outlined in the current legislation (History). Additionally, Senator Jeffords pointed to data that suggested the measure of "adequate yearly progress" was off the mark. The potential for embarrassment was evident – the standards were setting schools up to fail, critics argued. "As a result, the conferees, rather than simply melding the two bills, were forced to devise a new one" (Broder).

There were 2,750 disagreements between the House and Senate versions of the bill -- some insignificant, some important. (Rudalevige). The Senate legislation would have increased the number of ESEA Act programs from 55 to 89, while the House version would have decreased the number to 47. After the conference, the overall number was down to 45 (House-Senate). Similar differences were apparent within the budget. The president's plan included $19 billion in funding, and the House version was $23 billion -- by contrast, the Senate version was $33 billion.

On December 13, the House agreed to the conference report by a vote of 381 to 41. The Senate agreed two days later, by a vote of 87 to 10. It was then "cleared for [the] White House." President Bush signed the bill into law on January 8. It became Public Law 107-110.

For President Bush, the new law was a public relations triumph. "This stop in Hamiliton, Ohio, is the first of a three-state stop today. The White House calling it a victory tour," Paula Zahn reported on CNN during live coverage of the signing (Zahn). The Washington Post's lead the next morning had a positive tone, too: "President Bush today signed into law the broadest rewriting of federal education policy in decades, celebrating Washington's top bipartisan achievement of 2001 with a three-state road show" (Milbank).

"This is the end of a legislative process," Bush said at the bill-signing ceremony. "Signing this bill is the end of a long, long time of people sitting in rooms trying to hammer out differences. It's a great symbol of what is possible in Washington when good people come together to do what's right. But it's just the beginning of change. And now it's up to you, the local citizens of our great land, the compassionate, decent citizens of America, to stand up and demand high standards, and to demand that no child -- not one single child in America -- is left behind" (President).

The legislative and presidential processes involved in the passing of legislation are complex and sophisticated. In the instance of No Child Left Behind, its roots can be found in Texas, where then-Governor Bush successfully implemented education reforms. This led to a campaign promise, and scribbles in a green notebook, and a meeting with representatives. From there, a 20 page blueprint of principles became a 1,200 page statement of law and legalese.

Behind closed doors negotiating and wrangling are vital parts of the process, all but hidden from the public's view. The struggle to achieve a bipartisan bill overshadowed some of the president's stated priorities. Secret proceedings among congressmen create challenges for constituents – communicating opinions is difficult when the climate isn't clear. Often times, the senators and representatives debated and discussed relatively small portions of the bill, ignoring more significant components and more sweeping changes. Governors, local representatives, school boards, superintendents, administrators, teachers, and parents sat on the sidelines as the details were determined. And now, the backlash – many local officials complain that the No Child Left Behind burden is undermining their efforts to improve schools.

The balance between local and federal control is a challenging one. The balance between compromise and confrontation is challenging, too. The balance between open door debate and closed door conceding is challenging, as well. Now the challenge is to interpret and implement the most sweeping educational reforms in a generation.