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English Class Essay: May 2003
The Pentagon’s “grand experiment” to embed reporters with military forces permitted unique coverage of the war in Iraq, and the embed program should continue in future conflicts but these correspondents must be complemented by independent eyes and ears on the ground and a focus on presenting consumers with the “big picture.” PART ONE: In Vietnam, war correspondents for the “big three” television networks could file a report from the front lines, send the film off for processing and broadcast days later, and be back in Saigon that night (Mnookin). Television has been held responsible for the U.S. defeat in Vietnam, and “this belief has had a profound effect during the past 30 years on efforts to control television images of conflict,” historians note (Sharkey). Every battle since Vietnam has been haunted by its ghost. Journalists were barred from the island of Grenada during the 1983 invasion “reporters who traveled to the island in boats were turned away at gunpoint” (Kurtz). In 1989, the Pentagon’s promises to help journalists reach Panama fell through. During the Persian Gulf War, censored “pool” reports were broadcast by journalists, but a news blackout kept any substantive reports from the battlefield off the air. With this track record, it was no surprise why journalists were skeptical of access to Gulf War II. "If there is a war with Iraq, it seems likely that access will be limited,” New York Times war correspondent Michael Gordon stated in October, 2002. “People will essentially be sitting in a briefing room” Los Angeles Times writer John Hendren shared a similar sentiment later in the month: "I'm concerned that it might be the most limited access we have ever seen” (Strupp). In December, though, Pentagon spokeswoman Victoria Clarke informed news bureau chiefs of “embedding” plans. In the beginning, details were scarce, but the Pentagon was optimistic. "We are absolutely convinced the more news and information that comes out of Iraq — if there's military action — the better off we'll all be,” Clarke stated. (Neuman). It sounded intriguing, but even former Pentagon spokespersons were a bit skeptical. “The key will be how well it works -- whether reporters get cleared to file,” Clinton administration Pentagon spokesman Kenneth Bacon said on December 8th (Neuman). By mid-winter, embedding assignments were provided to newsrooms. A wide range of media organizations received slots the New York Times, MTV, The Fresno Bee, Al Jazeera. In February, the Pentagon released a document listing “not-releasable” categories of information. Embedded reporters could not release information about on-going engagements could not be released unless permitted by the commander; share details of military unit locations; or inform the public of missing or downed aircraft while search and rescue operations were underway, among other rules (Mitchell). Hundreds of reporters underwent war training, both by private companies and military-arranged. Journalists practiced donning gas masks and putting on biochemical protection gear. Embedded correspondents were required to receive several inoculations, protecting against anthrax and smallpox, among other diseases. They had no idea what toxins might await them in the desert. PART TWO: On March 20th, as midnight neared on the East Coast, the sun dawned on United States forces as they entered Iraq. CNN star Aaron Brown manned the network’s Atlanta anchor desk, interviewing a retired general, when pixelated, slightly distorted images of a tank convoy appeared on-screen. For the first time ever in the history of television, viewers were transported to the back of an Abrams tank, heading toward Baghdad. "These are live pictures of the 7th Cavalry racing across the deserts in southern Iraq," Rodgers exclaimed. "What you're watching here...is truly historic television and journalism” (Sharkey). 600 journalists joined Rodgers in the desert of Iraq and inside forward command centers in Kuwait, aboard aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf, and alongside air strips in Saudi Arabia. "Being inside the beast isn't so bad,” Rodgers told a media critic. "We're getting unbelievable access. I don't believe I've ever had such access over 36 years of reporting” (Kurtz). Embedded reporters seemed to relish the opportunity. "It's an incredible experience," Fox News Channel correspondent Rick Leventhal told Daily Variety Online. "We have incredible access to the Marines who are fighting this war. We've gotten to know them and they've gotten to know us. It's enabled me to get to a position where I never thought I would be, fighting next to troops." There were hiccups in the plan. A type of satellite phone was temporarily banned, “out of fear the phone's signal would broadcast troop locations to the Iraqi military” (Weisman). Constant reports from the front lines enhanced a moment-by-moment analysis of the war plan, angering military officials who denounced “armchair generals” and glaring assumptions based on one field report. Some reporters were “blacked out” for days at the start of the invasion, unable to inform their news desks of their status. For the most part, the “ground rules” were adhered to. Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel correspondent Nahal Toosi described her experiences in an online chat in April: “For the first 96 hours of the war's launch, the head guy in charge of the media in my unit looked through our stories to ensure we weren't giving away exact locations, etc. that could compromise operational security. But he only asked me to change one phrase that whole time, and it related to location. After that, they weren't allowed to see the stories, though embedded reporters did have to continue adhering to the established ground rules” (Interactive). Ethical questions quickly arose as embedded correspondents reported on causalities before the Pentagon could confirm the news. The wife of one marine caused NBC anchor Tom Brokaw to tear up on air during the first week of the conflict: “I truly admire what all of the network news and all the new technology is doing today to bring it into our homes," Nancy Chamberlin said. "But for the mothers and the wives who are out there watching, it is murder. It's heartbreak. We can't leave the television. Every tank, every helicopter, 'Is that my son?' And I just need you to be aware that technology is -- it's great -- but there are moms, there are dads, there are wives out there that are suffering because of this” (Kurtz). And then there were the “unis.” The Pentagon deemed the journalists in Iraq who were not embedded “unilaterals.” “I heard that the coalition forces received no fewer than 60 calls from desperate “unilaterals” travelling alone in the desert who came under fire,” one British reporter wrote in the Times of London newspaper (DiGiovanni). Unilaterals were hampered by huge logistical challenges. Many were unable to even enter the country, stuck on the border in Kuwait or Jordan. Two embedded reporters died in Iraq; at least nine un-embedded journalists did. “The Pentagon officer who conceived and advanced the embedded journalist program should step forward and demand a fourth star for his epaulets,” one media critic wrote on March 25th (Shafer). For the most part, the Pentagon was pleased with the results and consumers were presented with a unique view of war. PART THREE: The vast majority of Americans gave the media high marks for their war coverage: A CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll found that 87% said the media were doing a good or excellent job in their reporting (Sharkey). "I wouldn't be the first person to reflect that the course of the great conflicts of the last century could well have been altered or could well have been much shorter if there had been journalists embedded with the armed forces of the participants,” Australian Prime Minister John Howard stated after the conclusion of major conflict. Both he and British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw pointed to the two World Wars as examples of this idea. “Had the public been able to see live coverage from the [first world war] trenches, I wonder for how long the governments of Asquith and Lloyd George could have maintained the war effort. Imagine the carnage of the Somme on Sky and BBC News 24," Straw remarked on April 1st. Military officials did not expect hourly updates from moving tank columns. “They envisioned television reporters finding time and a strong enough satellite signal to broadcast "live shots" only once or twice a day,” the Washington Post reported at the end of March. "We just thought the natural challenges of broadcasting from the field would restrict it,” one official said. "Had we known it would be this wide open, we might have considered restrictions” (Weisman). Indeed, the technology used in battle was sometimes stunning. "The satellite uplink CNN used out of Baghdad in 1991 weighed two tons and was about 40 cases of gear," the network’s chief news executive Eason Jordan pointed out in March. "Now we have dishes mounted on top of Land Rovers” (Johnson). “I find myself yearning for the days when one got in a car in Bosnia and simply drove down sniper’s alley — who ever needed five press passes, impossible visas, a chemical warfare suit, two satellite phones and an embed with the US Marines to report a story?,” one British reporter asked (DiGiovanni). (Part three not complete)
Neuman, Johanna. “Military embraces media coverage of Iraq war.” Los Angeles Times News Service. 08 December 2002. http://www.kentucky.com/mld/miamiherald/news/nation/4690678.htm> Mitchell, Greg. “U.S. Military Document Outlines War Coverage.” Editor & Publisher Online. 14 February 2003. http://www.editorandpublisher.com/editorandpublisher/headlines/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1817934> Sharkey, Jacqueline. “The Television War.” American Journalism Review. May 2003. http://ajr.org/Article.asp?id=2988> Interactive Chat: Nahal Toosi. Journal-Sentinel Online. 29 April 2003. http://www.jsonline.com/news/gen/apr03/137132.asp> Weisman, Jonathan. “Open Access For Media Troubles Pentagon.” washingtonpost.com. 31 March 2003. http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A55513-2003Mar30¬Found=true> DiGiovanni, Jamie. “Don’t Shoot The Messenger.” The Times of London Online. 27 March 2003. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/printFriendly/0,,1-152-625039,00.html> Kurtz, Howard. “For Media After Iraq, A Case of Shell Shock.” washingtonpost.com. 28 April 2003. http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wpdyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A46401-2003Apr27¬Found=true> Johnson, Peter. “Conflict constantly tests media boundaries.” Usatoday.com. http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2003-03-23-media-usat_x.htm> Kurtz, Howard. “Reports With A Troops-Eye-View.” Washingtonpost.com. 22 March 2003. http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A7688-2003Mar21¬Found=true Shafer, Jack. “The PR War.” Slate.com. 25 March 2003. http://slate.msn.com/id/2080699/ Mnookin, Seth. “War Reports.” MSNBC.com. 22 April 2003. http://www.msnbc.com/news/903675.asp?cp1=1> “Embedded Media Shorten Wars.” The Daily Telegraph Online. 13 May 2003. http://www.dailytelegraph.news.com.au/common/story_page/0,5936,6260149%255E1702,00.html Gibson, Owen. “Straw warns against snap judgements.” The Guardian. 1 April 2003. http://media.guardian.co.uk/broadcast/story/0,7493,927359,00.html |
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